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Abstract— This paper presents a methodology to evaluate
the admissibility of actuator fault configurations (AFC) when
Linear Constrained Model Predictive Control (LCMPC) is
used. The methodology combines the use of structural and
feasability analysis. Structural analysis allows to evaluate the
loss of reachability after a fault occurrence. The results of the
structural analysis can be complemented with the feasibility
analysis of the MPC problem taking into account the effect
of actuator constraints after the fault occurrence. Additionally,
a degradation analysis of the system performance can also be
included. The proposed methodology is tested in the Barcelona
water network.
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of evaluating the admissibility of actuator
fault conﬁgurations considering a linear predictive/optimal
control law with constraints is studied in this paper. This
problem has been already treated in the literature for the
case of LQR problem without constraints [1][2], due to
the existence of analytical solution. However, constraints
(on states and control signals) are always present in real
industrial control problems and could be easily handled using
Linear Constrained Model Predictive Control (LCMPC). But
in general, an analytical solution for these kind of control
laws does not exist, which makes difﬁcult to do this type
of analysis. The method proposed in this paper is not of
analytical but of computational nature. It follows the idea
proposed by [3] in which the calculation of the control law
for a predictive/optimal controller with constraints can be
divided in two steps: ﬁrst, the calculation of solutions set that
satisﬁes the constraints (feasible solutions) and second, the
optimal solution determination. Following this approach, the
authors have already proposed a method based on zonotope-
based set computations [4].
Faults in actuators cause changes in the set of feasible
solutions since constraints on the control signals vary. As a
consequence, this causes that the set of admissible solutions
for the control objective could be empty. Therefore, the
admissibility of the control law facing the actuator faults can
be determined knowing the feasible solutions set. One of the
aims of this paper is to provide a methodology to evaluate
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the admissibility of the control law without evaluating the
feasible solutions set.
This paper presents a methodology to evaluate the admis-
sibility of actuator fault conﬁgurations when Linear Con-
strained Model Predictive Control (LCMPC) is used. For
a general framework of this type of analysis see [5]. The
methodology combines the use of structural and feasability
analysis. In the structural approach, a reachability analysis
after a fault occurrence is made. The results of the structural
analysis can be complemented with the feasibility analysis
of the MPC problem taking into account the effect of
actuator constraints after a fault occurrence. Additionally,
a degradation analysis of the system performance can also
be included. The proposed methodology is tested in the
Barcelona water network in order to show its effectiveness
and promising results.
The organization of the paper is as follows: Section II
establishes the proposal of the ﬁrst stage in developing a
fault tolerant control, which is the evaluation of the network
conﬁguration. Section III explains both of the analysis made
to the conﬁguration and describes the algorithms used.
The case study and results obtained through the proposed
approach are shown in Section IV as well. Finally, Section
V concludes the paper.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. Statement of the Control Problem
Consider a linear system in discrete-time with constraints
in states and actuators and that is controlled by an LCMPC
law. According to [6], the solution of a control problem
consists in ﬁnding a control law from a given set of control
laws U , such that the controlled system achieves the control
objectives O while its behaviour satisﬁes a set of constraints
C . Thus, the solution of the problem is completely deﬁned
by the triple 〈O,C ,U 〉. In the case of an LCMPC, the triple
〈O,C ,U 〉 is deﬁned by
O : min
u˜
J(x˜, u˜), (1)
subject to
C :


xk+1 = Axk +Buk,
uk ∈U k ∈ [0,N− 1]⊂ N,
xk ∈X k ∈ [0,N]⊂ N,
(2)
where
U
∆
= {u ∈ Rm |umin ≤ u ≤ umax} , (3)
X
∆
= {x ∈ Rn |xmin ≤ x ≤ xmax} , (4)
A and B are the system matrices and N denotes the time
horizon. The control law belongs to the set U and it is
obtained using the receding horizon philosophy [7], [8]. This
technique consists in taking only the ﬁrst value from the
sequence u˜ computed at each time instant by solving the
previous optimization problem. Initial states x0 are updated
from measurements or state estimation. The objective func-
tion J is deﬁned, in general form, as
J(x˜, u˜) = φ(xN)+
N−1
∑
i=0
Φ(xi,ui), (5)
where φ is a function that constraints the ﬁnal state value
over N and Φ is a function of state and input sequences over
a given time horizon N denoted by
x˜ = (xk)
N
0 = (x0,x1, . . . ,xN) , (6)
u˜ = (uk)
N−1
0 = (u0,u1, . . . ,uN−1) .
B. Statement of the Fault-tolerant Control Problem
Fault-Tolerant Control (FTC) is concerned with the control
of a faulty system. There exists two types of FTC approaches:
the active and the passive. The active FTC uses a Fault
Detection and Isolation (FDI) module to know the state of
each component of the network and based in the diagnosis of
the fault, the controller adapts the control law to achieved the
established set point. On the other hand, in the passive FTC,
the FDI module is not used and the controller is designed to
cope with the fault without adaptation.
In the active FTC, there exist two main strategies to adapt
the control loop in order to introduce fault tolerance:
1) Fault Accommodation: Consists in solving the control
problem 〈O ,Cˆ f (Θˆ f ),Uˆ f 〉, being Cˆ f (Θˆ f ) an estimation
of actual system constraints and parameters provided
by the FDI module.
2) System Reconfiguration: Consists in ﬁnding a new set
of constraints C f (Θ f ) such that the control problem
〈O,C f (Θ f ),U f 〉 can be solved.
In the previous strategies, the subscript f denotes the fault
presence.
III. ADMISSIBILITY ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY
A. Introduction
The admissibility analysis methodology proposed in this
paper consists of two main algorithms based on structural
analysis and constraint satisfaction techniques that evaluate
the impact of a fault occurrence in the control loop. The ﬁrst
algorithm relies on graph theory to analyze the connectivity
properties of the system, while the second one evaluates the
feasibility of the control law taking into account the system
constraints.
Both algorithms consider the set of all subsets of system
actuators I, denoted by 2I . For each subset J ⊆ I, the
algorithms evaluate whether a given system property, denoted
by P(J), is satisﬁed or not [9]. Thus,
P(J) =
{
1 if property is satisﬁed,
0 if property is not satisﬁed.
(7)
This evaluation induces the set of all subsets of I, 2I , a
two-class partition as follows:
2I+ = {J ⊆ I;P(J) = 1}, (8)
2I− = {J ⊂ I;P(J) = 0}. (9)
The class 2I+ contains all the subsets of the actuators in
which a speciﬁc property is satisﬁed.
The admissibility analysis will permit, among other things,
to ﬁnd:
• Critical components: i.e., the set of system components
that are indispensable to satisfy a determined property.
• Redundant components: i.e., the system components
which are not critical for the correct functionality of
the system, therefore they could be subtracted and the
satisfaction of the property will still be guaranteed.
• Redundancy degree: consists of the number of extra
non-critical components through which the property
could be guaranteed. There are two types of redundancy:
weak (corresponding to larger number of sequential
faults that can be tolerated in the best case) and strong
(that corresponds the smaller number of sequentails
faults that ca be tolerated in the worst-case).
B. Structural Analysis Algorithm
The structural analysis algorithm analyzes the connectivity
properties of the system without considering the actual value
of the parameters of the components or the limitations of
the actuators1. This algorithm can be used to evaluate the
admissibility of a given AFC when the reconﬁguration FTC
is used, i.e., when an actuator is removed after the fault
occurrence and the system should be controlled with the
remaining actuators.
The main steps of the structural analysis algorithm imple-
mented in this paper are summarized in Algorithm 1. The
algorithm starts building a digraph G(V ,E ) of the system
S using system model (2). See [10] for details on how to
obtain a digraph from the system model. Using the digraph,
the input reachability of the system for a given AFC will be
evaluated. If this property is preserved after the actuator fault
occurrence, the AFC is admissible, that is able to tolerate the
fault; otherwise is not admissible.
To deﬁne the concept of input reachability, ﬁrst the concept
of path in a digraph will be recalled [10].
Definition 3.1 (Path): Given a digraph G = (V ,E ), a
collection of vertices v1,v2, . . . ,vk together with the edges
(v1,v2),(v2,v3), . . . ,(vk−1,vk) placed in sequence, then the
ordered set (v1,v2),(v2,v3), . . . ,(vk−1,vk) is a path from v1
to vk. ♦
Then, it is said that vi is reachable from v j if there is a
path from v j to vi.
Definition 3.2 (Reachable set of a vertex): A reachable
set V i(v j) of a vertex v j is a set V i of vertices vi reachable
from the vertex v j ∈ V . ♦
1Important deﬁnitions related to the topic can be found in [6].
Definition 3.3 (Reachable set of a vertices set): A reach-
able set V i(V j) as the set of vertices vi reachable from at
least one vertex v j ∈ V j. ♦
Notice that V i(V j) is the union of the sets V i(v j) for all
v j ∈ V j.
Definition 3.4 (Input reachable system): A system S with
a digraph G = (X ∪U ,E ) is input reachable if X is a
reachable set of U . ♦
From previous deﬁnition follows that if no input u j can
reach a state xi, either directly or through other states/inputs
of the system, then there is no way of controlling the system
to satisfy the desired control objective, i.e., the system is
uncontrollable.
In order to establish the input reachability of a system S
with digraph G = (V ,E ), the reachability matrix R = (ri j),
deﬁned as
ri j =
{
1 if vi is reachable from v j,
0 otherwise,
(10)
should be computed. According to [10], to determine the
reachability matrix there are several algorithms. One of
the straighforward way to do so is through the following
expression:
ri j =
{
0 if qi j = 0,
1 if qi j 6= 0,
(11)
where Q = (qi j) = E +E2+ . . .+Es and E is the intercon-
nection matrix, deﬁned as
E =

 A B 00 0 0
C 0 0


, (12)
where the submatrices A,B,C are boolean representations of
the original system matrices A,B,C in space state.
Algorithm 1 Reachability Analysis using Structural Ap-
proach
1: Obtain the digraph G = (X ∪U ,E ) of the system S
using system model for a given AFC
2: From the system digraph G = (X ∪U ,E ), ﬁnd the
reachability matrix R
3: for each xi ∈ X , i = 1, ...,nx do
4: for each u j ∈U, j = 1, ...,nu do
5: if ri j = 0 then
6: AFC is non reachable
7: else
8: AFC is reachable
9: end if
10: end for
11: end for
In order to ﬁnd critical and redundant actuators, recall that
I is the whole set of the system sensors, which are supposed
to be all available when the system is operating. Each subset
J ⊆ I represents the actuator network state in which some
sensors have been lost. Thus, the set of all possible situations
is identiﬁed with 2I (the collection of the subsets of I) and
it can be graphically represented by a multi-level automaton
(see [1]) in which
• a node is associated with each subset of I, and is
interpreted as a set of available actuators;
• the initial node is associated with the whole set of
sensors I; and
• a transition from one node to another one is associated
with changes in the set of the available actuators.
The system is actuator fault tolerant as long as the remaining
actuators guarantee the input reachability property. Evalu-
ating the actuator fault tolerance capability of the system
consists in computing the length of the paths between the
initial (all actuatorsare healthy) and the terminal conﬁgura-
tion (i.e., the remaining actuators do not satisfy the input
reachability property). The length of the longest path in this
automaton and a terminal conﬁguration corresponds to the
weak redundancy degree, while the length of the shortest
path corresponds to the strong redundancy degree. A critical
actuator in a given actuator conﬁguration corresponds to
the one that, if it is lost, the remaining actuators do not
satisfy the input reachability property; otherwise the actuator
is redundant.
C. Constraint Satisfaction Algorithm
When an accommodation FTC strategy is used, the actu-
ator is not removed after the fault but is operated under the
remaining operating range estimated by the FDI module. To
evaluate the admissibility of the control, it is not possible
to use the structural analysis algorithm. In this case, the
admissibility evaluation problem for a given AFC can be
naturally handled as constraint satisfaction problem. Thus,
the deﬁnition of the constraint satisfaction problem (CSP) is
presented and some particular details related to this approach
are presented and discussed. Then, this approach is applied
to the AFC admissibility evaluation.
A CSP on sets can be formulated as a 3-tuple
H = (W ,D ,Z ) [11], where
• W = {w1, · · · ,wn} is a ﬁnite set of variables;
• D = {D1, · · · ,Dn} is the set of their domains (where,
in this paper, Di ⊆ R, i = 1, · · · ,n);
• Z = {z1, · · · ,zn} is a ﬁnite set of constraints relating
variables of W .
A point solution of H is a n-tuple (v˜1, · · · , v˜n)∈D such that
all constraints Z are satisﬁed. The set of all point solutions
of H is denoted by S (H ). This set is called the global
solution set. The variable wi ∈Wi is consistent in H if and
only if
∀wi ∈Wi ∃ (w˜1 ∈,D1 · · · , w˜n ∈Dn) |(w˜1, · · · , w˜n) ∈S (H ),
with i = 1...n. The solution of a CSP is said to be globally
consistent, if and only if every variable is consistent con-
sidering the whole set of constraints. A variable is locally
consistent if and only if it is consistent with respect to a
group of constraints. Thus, the solution of a CSP is said to
be locally consistent if all variables are locally consistent.
The admissibility evaluation of an AFC corresponds natu-
rally to a CSP on sets. Algorithm 2 allows the admissibility
evaluation of a given AFC by solving the associated CSP
deﬁned by the system equations, the operative limits on
inputs and states over N and the initial state.
It is well known that the solution of this kind of problems
has a high computational complexity since in order to repre-
sent the solutions sets accurately they should be decomposed
using subpavings, which implies exponential computation
times [11].
However, in order to evaluate the fault tolerance of a
LCMPC controller after a fault occurrence, it is not required
to ﬁnd the solution of the CSP, but whether the CSP problem
has or not solution. In particular, the fact that a CSP does
not have solution means that the LCMPC controller is not
fault tolerant with respect to the considered fault. Otherwise,
it would be fault tolerant.
The existence of the solution of the CSP associated
to the tolerance evaluation of LCMPC for a given faulty
situation can be proved by solving the following optimization
problem:
O : min 0, (13)
subject to
C :


φ(xN)+
N−1
∑
i=0
Φ(xi,ui)≤ J f ,
xk+1 = Axk +Buk,
uk ∈U k ∈ [0,N− 1]⊂ N,
xk ∈X k ∈ [0,N]⊂ N,
(14)
where
U
∆
= {u ∈ Rm |umin ≤ u ≤ umax} , (15)
X
∆
= {x ∈ Rn |xmin ≤ x ≤ xmax} . (16)
In the case that this problem is feasible, the CSP has
solution and LCMPC controller is fault tolerant with respect
to the control objective (5) with a control objective degrada-
tion less or equal to J f , which establishes the admissibility
threshold.
Algorithm 2 Feasibility evaluation using CSP
1: for k = 1 to N do
2: Uk−1 ⇐U
3: Xk ⇐X
4: end for
5: W ⇐ {
x˜︷ ︸︸ ︷
x1,x2, · · · ,xN ,
u˜︷ ︸︸ ︷
u1,u2, · · · ,uN−1,J}
6: D ⇐{X1,X2, · · · ,XN ,U1,U2, · · · ,UN−1,JA }
7: Z ⇐
{
(xk+1 = Axk +Buk)N−10 ,J(x˜, u˜) = φ(xN)+
N−1
∑
i=0
Φ(xi,ui)
}
8: HA = (W ,D ,Z )
9: A = solve(HA )
10: if A = /0 then
11: AFC is non-admissible
12: else
13: AFC is admissible
14: end if
Fig. 2. Graph of the Barcelona DWN
IV. RESULTS
A. Case Study Description
The drinking water network (DWN) of Barcelona is used
as the case study of this paper. This network is managed
by Aguas de Barcelona S.A (AGBAR), which not only
supplies drinking water to Barcelona city but also to the
metropolitan area. The sources of water are the rivers Ter
and Llobregat. Currently, there are four potabilisation plants:
Abrera and Sant Joan Despí plants, which extract water from
river Llobregat; Cardedeu plant, which extracts water from
river Ter; and Besòs plant, which treats the underground
ﬂows from the aquifer of Besòs river. There are also several
underground sources (wells) that may provide water through
pumping procedures. These sources should currently provide
a ﬂow of around 12m3/s. The Barcelona drinking water
network is currently comprised of 67 tanks and 121 actuators,
which are divided in 46 pumps and 75 valves (see Figure
1). Figure 2 shows the graph of the network. Among of
the pumps, ﬁve of them draw water from the underground
sources, whereas the others are used to carry the water to
those places with different elevation (higher city sectors).
Moreover, the network has 88 main sectors of consume and
16 water nodes. Both the demand episode and the calibration
setup of the network are provided by AGBAR. The current
AGBAR control centre has a tele-control system for the
network management. The Barcelona water network is also
comprised of more than 98 remote stations, which manages
in real time about 450 elements: ﬂow meters, pumping
stations, valves, chloride dosing instruments, etc.
According to the system model shown in (2), states related
to the case study are represented by tanks and water nodes.
The former are expressed by constraints regarding the maxi-
mal and minimal volume that tanks can store. The latter obey
the mass balance law (amount of water entering the node
equals to amount of water leaving the node). The control
vector corresponds to water ﬂows through actuators, which
are constrained by their own physical limitations. Matrices A
and B are deﬁned by the physical topology of the network.
In order to fulﬁll the control objectives of the system, the
objective function deﬁned in (5) should be minimized based
on the cost of the proper operation of the entire network,
satisfying the demands of water in each sector of consume.
This operational cost of the network is composed by the
electric (tariffs of electricity related to the operation of pumps
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Fig. 1. Barcelona Drinking Water Network
and valves) and water (price of the water at its source) costs.
B. Simulation Results
Five tests/analyses have been made over the case study.
Figure 3 shows the sequence of test performed. The ﬁrst
test consists in ﬁnding the critical network actuators by
means of its structural analysis. These critical actuators are
those which, without them (outage), the connectivity of
a path is lost. Results of this test, collected in Table I,
evidence an important number of critical actuators within
the network. This fact is caused by the topology and the
way of connecting the network elements: most actuators
(either valves or pumps) are just connected between tanks
and demands. Therefore, if an actuator fault occurs, the
corresponding demand will not be satisﬁed.
The second analysis done to the Barcelona DWTN con-
sists in the determination of those actuators whose physical
constraints limit the capacity of water transport thought a
certain path. Notice that this analysis do not consider any
fault in those actuators. The analysis, performed by using
an optimization algorithm, results also in the statement of
several alternative paths through which the water transport
is possible (or even mandatory) given the constraints of the
paths for supplying demands.
Results of this latter analysis yield the determination
of another critical actuator: actuator 52 (namelly vBesos-
MontCerd). Notice that the increment in the amount of
Fig. 3. Flow diagram of the proposed methodology
critical actuators taking in account the actuator physical
constraints is not signiﬁcant.
The third analysis consists in the determination of the
optimal paths to reach a selected destination node without
considering the constraints of the system, i.e., the structural
optimal paths. This analysis is performed by using structural
algorithm in the way already explained in Section III-B.
Results of this test are not provided in this paper due to
space constraints.
Fourth analysis naturally consists in the statement of the
set of optimal paths including the objective function in (5)
and the system constraints (in states and actuators). Paths
details are not provided here, but the total economic cost of
TABLE I
STRUCTURAL CRITICAL ACTUATORS
No. Name No. Name No. Name No. Name No. Name
122 iAltures 15 iCanGuey2 62 iGuinardera1 30 iPapiol1 44 iVallensana1
10 iBegues1 14 iCanGuey3 60 iGuinardera2 88 iSJD10 8 iViladecans1
6 iBegues2 21 iCanRoig 101 iLaSentiu 7 iStBoi 4 iViladecans2
2 iBegues3 57 iCanRuti 34 iMasGuimbau1 9 iStCliment1 25 vAbrera
1 iBegues4 37 iCarmel 31 iMasGuimbau2 5 iStCliment2 54 vCerdanyola90
32 iBellsoleig 43 iCerdMontﬂorit 100 iMasJove 40 iStGenis1 63 vMontigala
61 iBonavista 42 iCerdUAB 68 iMntjcStaAmalia 38 iStGenis2 27 vPalleja70
20 iCanGuell1 12 iCesalpina1 69 iMntjcTresPins 13 iStaClmCervello 90 vSJD
17 iCanGuell2d3 11 iCesalpina2 3 iOrioles 45 iStaMaMontcada 104 vSJDTot
16 iCanGuell2d5 82 iCornella100 23 iPalleja1 35 iTibidabo 58 vTer
18 iCanGuey1d2 39 iFlorMaig 24 iPalleja2 56 iTorreBaro1 59 vTerStaColoma
19 iCanGuey1d5 109 iFnestrelles300 26 iPalleja4 65 iTorreoCastell
TABLE II
NETWORK PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS FOR TEST 5
Actuator No. Faulty price [e.u.] Cost overrun [%]
41 514.44 2.43
47 515.94 2.73
74 528.05 5.14
78 557.62 11.03
86 515.08 2.55
89 556.22 10.74
97 510.49 1.64
102 539.87 7.49
103 552.21 9.95
maintaining a functional network with satisfaction of all the
demands is 502.25 e.u.2
Finally, performance analysis has been done as ﬁfth test.
The test has been performed using the objective function in
(5), where the b array is formed with the real values for
the actuator constraints. Several simulations using linprog
have been performed, including a faulty component in each
one by setting b(i) = 0; if a feasible solution is found, the
cost of maintaining an operational network is computed and
compared with costs obtained in through previous analyses.
The difference in prices shows the impact that a single
malfunctioning actuator has in the entire network. Results
from this analysis are collected in Table II. Notice that
all comparisons are done taking into account an optimal
functioning price (under faultless conditions) of 502.25 e.u.
Moreover, faulty price denotes the functioning price under
faulty conditions.
According to the analysis made to the system, some actu-
ators do not have signiﬁcant impact in the total performing
cost (overrun over 1%, e.g., actuators 28, 29, 33, 64, 71, 80,
81, 85, 87, 94, 107, 108, 113), but there are some others (such
as 78 or 89) that induce an important increment in the price,
taking in account the daily estimation. These latter actuators
are shown in Table II. Degradation in prices obtained with
this analysis can be the foundation for the introduction of
redundant actuators in the network or an alternative way of
fault tolerance strategy.
2In this paper, economic amounts are given in economic units (e.u.) rather
than real units (e) for conﬁdentiality reasons.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper have presented a methodology to evaluate the
admissibility of actuator fault conﬁgurations when Linear
Constrained Model Predictive Control (LCMPC) is used. The
methodology combines the use of structural and feasibility
analysis. Structural analysis allows to evaluate the loss of
connectivity analysis in the presence of a fault. The results
of the structural analysis can be complemented with the
feasibility analysis of the MPC problem taking into account
the effect of actuator constraints after the fault occurrence.
Additionally, a degradation analysis in the system perfor-
mance can also be included. The proposed methodology has
been successfully tested in the Barcelona water network. As
a further research, additional criteria as actuator reliability
will be included in the proposed methodology.
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